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1 
ESSAY 
 
THE HANDICAPPING EFFECT OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN 
REPRODUCTIVE TORT CASES: CORRECTING THE LEGAL 
PERCEPTION OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 
KERRY T. COOPERMAN* 
“Changes are necessary; but what they ought to be, what they 
will be, and how and when to be produced, are arduous 
questions.”—John Jay (1786)1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Over the past twenty-five years, progressive legislation and aggressive 
advocacy have generated policies under which people with disabilities 
could participate more meaningfully in America’s social, political, and 
professional spheres.  The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (the 
“ADA”)2 codified the most comprehensive safeguards of civil rights since 
the 1960s and carried the hope that it would enable people with disabilities 
to engage equally in their communities.3  A major player in the passage of 
the ADA,4 the disability community continued to develop political 
footholds, spearhead local and national social movements, and insist on 
new statutory protections.  But this initial momentum did not yield the 
 
Copyright © 2008 by Kerry T. Cooperman. 
* Kerry Cooperman is a third-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law 
where he is a Notes and Comments Editor for the Maryland Law Review.  The author wishes to 
thank a number of people whose ideas and energy enriched this piece.  The author is endlessly 
grateful to Professor Mark Rothstein for introducing him to the challenges of disability law and 
for patiently guiding his writing process.  Professors Diane Hoffman and Wendy Hensel merit 
equal praise for their inspiring and ongoing contributions to the field of health care ethics.  
Heather Pruger’s talent and intellectual support were also invaluable to him.  Finally, the author 
owes special thanks to Veronica Berruz, whose civic impulse and rare sensibility have pushed him 
to care more deeply about communities that are just out of sight. 
 1. WILLIAM JAY, II THE LIFE OF JOHN JAY 191 (1833).   
 2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–213 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). 
 3. See Ann Hubbard, The Major Life Activity of Belonging, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217, 
255 (2004) (stating that the ADA is “rich with proclamations of a national commitment to 
welcome persons with disabilities into all aspects of society”). 
 4. See Deborah Kaplan, The Definition of Disability: Perspective of the Disability 
Community, 3 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 352, 352 (2000) (noting that the disability rights 
movement “can claim primary political responsibility for the ADA”). 
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substantive changes that many had anticipated.5  Nearly a decade after the 
ADA’s enactment, employees with disabilities lost over 95% of ADA 
cases;6 the Supreme Court of the United States restricted the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission’s power to construe the ADA’s 
protections;7 and prenatal genetic testing continued to spawn reproductive 
tort claims that negatively stereotyped persons with disabilities.8 
Reproductive technology has become a double-edged sword for the 
disability community.  Although genetic innovation promises new medical 
therapies,9 it also breeds new litigation that etches false conceptions of 
disability, harm, and autonomy into the common law and the national 
consciousness.  Alas, courts and legislatures often disregard the social 
messages that their laws fortify, and “surprisingly little legal scholarship” 
explains how reproductive tort claims affect people with disabilities.10 
This Essay argues that courts should contextualize their views of 
disability, health, and legal harm by recognizing families’ diverse 
circumstances and constrained choices, instead of propagating stigmatizing 
stereotypes about people with disabilities through an outmoded 
reproductive tort jurisprudence.  First, this Essay shows why the conceptual 
framework through which courts decide reproductive tort claims conveys 
harmful messages about the value of persons with disabilities.11  Second, it 
argues that judicial reasoning should embody more contextual, non-
dichotomous solutions that protect the diversity of the sensitive interests at 
stake.12  Third, it posits that a contextual jurisprudence will become 
increasingly vital as social, scientific, and legal forces continue to constrain 
parental reproductive choices.13  Last, this Essay concludes that courts must 
consider the profound influence their jurisprudence has on societal views of 
 
 5. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as Welfare Reform, 44 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 921, 923 (2003) (observing that the success rate for plaintiffs in ADA cases 
“is second in futility only to that of prisoner plaintiffs”). 
 6. John W. Parry, 1999 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I—Survey Update, 24 
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 348, 348 (2000). 
 7. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 479 (1999) (ruling that “no agency,” 
including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “has been delegated authority to 
interpret the term ‘disability’”). 
 8. See infra Part II.C. 
 9. See, e.g., Edward J. Larson, The Meaning of Human Gene Testing for Disability Rights, 
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 913, 913 (2002) (noting that the completion of the Human Genome Project and 
other related projects led researchers to isolate the genes that contribute to Alzheimer’s disease, 
breast cancer, cystic fibrosis, Gaucher Disease, fragile X Syndrome, and Huntington’s disease). 
 10. Wendy F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 144 (2005). 
 11. See infra Part II.   
 12. See infra Part III.   
 13. See infra Part IV.   
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the disability community and must adopt a contextual approach to combat 
prevalent social stereotypes.14 
II.  JUDICIAL OPINIONS IN REPRODUCTIVE TORT CASES CONVEY HARMFUL 
STEREOTYPES ABOUT PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES BY REINFORCING 
THE MEDICAL MODEL OF DISABILITY, EMBRACING OUTMODED 
NOTIONS OF LEGAL HARM, AND USING STIGMATIZING RHETORIC 
The disability rights movement seeks to propagate a more truthful 
perception of what it means to live with a disability.15  But because notions 
of “disability” and “harm” are complex, controversial, and fluid, 
legislatures and courts rarely achieve consensus on definitions when 
drafting statutes and deciding cases, respectively.16  Nor do these entities 
adequately evaluate the social forces and political ideologies that influence 
their decision-making.17  Thus, legislative and judicial decisions frequently 
result in false dichotomies between healthy children and children with 
disabilities that perpetuate harmful and stigmatizing stereotypes.18 
A.  Complex and Varied Models of “Disability” and “Harm” Give 
Context to Reproductive Tort Claims, While Highlighting 
Underlying Moral Tensions 
Disability policy scholars have developed three principal models of 
disability that give context to reproductive tort disputes.  First, the “medical 
model” treats disability as a natural defect that causes incapacity, yields 
social isolation and economic dependence, and requires medical 
intervention.19  Under this model, society need not alleviate the social 
disadvantages that arise from disability because nature, not society, causes 
disability.20  Thus, social policy based on the medical model encourages 
people with disabilities to “approximate dominant physical standards as 
 
 14. See infra Part V.   
 15. Kaplan, supra note 4, at 352. 
 16. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Pendo, Disability, Doctors and Dollars: Distinguishing the Three 
Faces of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1175, 1189–91 & 1189 n.45 (2002) 
(noting that “the failure to develop a coherent and consistent theory of disability” has resulted in 
“inconsistent” judicial results); see also infra Part II.A. (examining various models of and 
approaches to “disability” and “harm”). 
 17. See infra Part II.B.   
 18. See infra Part II.C.   
 19. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 146 (stating that under the medical model of disability, 
disability “results from the internal functional limitations of an individual”). 
 20. Id.  As a result, “any remediation society chooses to undertake [is] . . . charitable 
intervention . . . .”  Id. at 147. 
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closely as possible” by using medical therapies to eradicate disability.21  In 
contrast, the “socio-political model” (the “social model”) deems disability 
to be a social construct arising from “environmental factors” such as 
culture, institutions, and private conduct.22  Unlike the medical model, the 
social model imposes certain duties on society because communities 
transform people with functional impairments into people with disabilities 
(e.g., a man who cannot walk cannot live in an apartment that lacks an 
elevator because society did not fully contemplate the non-ambulatory).23  
Finally, the “minority group model” posits that disability is not only a social 
construct, but also one that creates a “discrete minority group” and “unified 
political body.”24  This model empowers people with disabilities to insist 
on the “eradication of exclusionary social practices . . . as a matter of civil 
rights.”25 
Like the meaning of “disability,” the meaning of “harm” becomes 
more elusive in the tort context as medical science creates new occasions 
for negligence in prenatal genetic testing.26  Under a lay definition of 
harm—in which harm equals physical ailment—injury and harm are 
effectively identical.27  But in the reproductive tort setting, where families 
suffer a variety of physical and non-physical injuries, harm is more 
accurately “the thwarting, setting back, or defeating of an interest.”28  
Further, the personal experience of harm can “both overlap and be quite 
distinct from legal conceptions of harm.”29 
 
 21. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Mary Crossley, The Disability 
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 627 (1999) (“[A] disability studies lens may bring 
into focus how some legal decisionmakers continue to act on the assumption that biology is 
destiny when it comes to disability.”); Hensel, supra note 10, at 146–47 (noting that the medical 
model “dominate[s] public thinking” and underlies global notions of disability). 
 22. Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 213, 214 (2000). 
 23. Id. at 215–16. 
 24. Hensel, supra note 10, at 149. 
 25. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  But see Crossley, supra note 21, at 
664 (noting that the social and minority-group models may not adequately account for the 
differences in the physical impairments and life-experiences among people with greatly varying 
disabilities). 
 26. See, e.g., NICOLETTE PRIAULX, THE HARM PARADOX: TORT LAW AND THE UNWANTED 
CHILD IN AN ERA OF CHOICE 4 (2007) (“The concept of ‘harm’, though seemingly self-evident, is 
thoroughly ambiguous.”); see also Hensel, supra note 10, at 150 (suggesting that while genetic 
technology and scholarship have progressed, the common law of torts “has clearly lagged 
behind”); Daniel W. Shuman, The Psychology of Deterrence in Tort Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 
115, 134 (1993) (“[V]arious tort rules reflect the coolness of the developing tort law to psychiatry 
and psychology.”). 
 27. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4. 
 28. JOEL FEINBERG, 1 THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 33 
(1984). 
 29. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4. 
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In her recent book on this subject, Professor Nicolette Priaulx states 
that “some kinds of harms are easily assimilated within the traditional 
corpus of law, [whereas] others do not lend themselves so easily to tortious 
characterisation [sic].”30  So to determine how wrongful birth and wrongful 
life claims affect people with disabilities, one must ask what and whose 
interests tort law serves.31  These questions raise others: Should courts 
apply a subjective or objective test to determine legal harm?  Is the birth of 
a healthy, unwanted newborn a legal harm?  Is the birth of a newborn with 
an expected disability a legal harm?  Is a violation of parental autonomy 
with respect to the existence of a newborn a legal harm?  Are a parent’s 
financial burden and emotional trauma legal harms?  Can healthy newborns 
cause more harm to parents than newborns with disabilities in certain 
circumstances?  If so, are these harms different by type or degree? 
The United Kingdom offers a useful body of case law that reveals the 
social backdrop of unsettled judicial perceptions of reproductive harm.  
British courts first evaluated reproductive harm in Udale v. Bloomsbury 
Area Health Authority,32 where a woman conceived after undergoing a 
failed sterilization procedure.33  Although the parents were entitled to 
certain prenatal damages,34 the Udale court ruled, they could not claim that 
their child’s birth was a legal harm because childbirth is “a blessing and an 
occasion for rejoicing.”35  Therefore, the costs of childbirth and 
childrearing were not compensable.36  
Two years later, the Thake v. Maurice37 court refused to follow 
Udale,38 reasoning that “the birth of a healthy baby is not always a 
blessing” because (1) family planning is prevalent; (2) abortions and 
vasectomies are lawful and common; and (3) childrearing is costly.39  That 
same year, the Court of Appeal of England relied on Thake’s principles in 
Emeh v. Kensington40 to award childrearing costs to a single woman who 
 
 30. Id. at 4–5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 31. Id. at 5. 
 32. (1983) 2 All E.R. 522 (Q.B.D.). 
 33. Id. at 523. 
 34. Id. at 527.  These prenatal damages were for the costs of (1) the original sterilization and 
re-sterilization; (2) the shock, anxiety, and fear of pregnancy; (3) the thwarting of the couple’s 
decision not to have more children; (4) the medical fees of pregnancy; and (5) the couple’s loss of 
earnings for eleven months.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 531. 
 36. Id. at 523–24, 531. 
 37. (1986) Q.B. 644 (Exeter). 
 38. Id. at 665–67. 
 39. Id.  Notably, the court stated that “every baby has a belly to be filled and a body to be 
clothed” and that a healthy newborn is a blessing only when “born to the happy family life which 
we would all like a baby to have.”  Id. at 666. 
 40. (1985) 1 Q.B. 1012 (A.C.). 
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birthed a child with a severe congenital defect after a failed sterilization.41  
But fifteen years later, England’s House of Lords returned to Udale’s 
reasoning in McFarlane v. Tayside Health Board,42 deciding that a couple 
that had a “healthy” child after a failed vasectomy could not recover 
childrearing costs.43  Deeming it “unrealistic” and “distasteful” to “place a 
monetary value on the birth of a normal and healthy child,” the McFarlane 
court declared that (1) “the birth of a normal, healthy baby [is] a blessing, 
not [a] detriment”; and (2) this blessing outweighs the costs of parenting.44 
These vacillating judicial decisions and diverse models of harm and 
disability highlight the moral tensions underlying reproductive tort cases.  
Even if a healthy child is a blessing, “invasive [contraceptive] medical 
procedures” signal that, to some couples, childbirth does not yield the “joy” 
that McFarlane describes.45  Professor Emily Jackson emphasizes this, 
noting that one’s “invasive surgery” to achieve infertility shows that 
childbirth is not always a blessing.46  By ruling that healthy children are not 
legal harms, however, English courts suggest that ones with disabilities may 
be legal harms—a dichotomy with pervasive effects. 
B.  The Uncertain Propriety of Reproductive Tort Claims Has Forced 
Judges to Publicly Confront Difficult Existential Questions 
Involving the Cost and Value of Life with a Disability, 
Nonexistence, Parenthood, and Legal Compensation 
Four main tort claims pressure judges to publicly assess the value and 
compensability of infants with disabilities: wrongful pregnancy, false 
representation, wrongful birth, and wrongful life.47  Wrongful pregnancy 
was the earliest reproductive tort claim in the United States, arising when 
unwanted pregnancy resulted from a failed abortion or sterilization, or from 
a manufacturer’s faulty contraceptive.48  As of 2005, thirty-one states and 
the District of Columbia recognized this claim.49  But like the McFarlane 
and Udale courts, most state courts prohibit childrearing damages and 
 
 41. Id. at 1015, 1021–22. 
 42. (2000) 2 A.C. 59 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.). 
 43. Id. at 83. 
 44. Id. at 111, 113–14. 
 45. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 4–6 (noting that the McFarlane court “erroneous[ly] and 
conveniently overlook[ed] the fact that . . . a ‘blessing’ has been forced upon” the couple). 
 46. Emily Jackson, Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle, 65 MOD. L. 
REV. 176, 199 (2002). 
 47. Hensel, supra note 10, at 151, 153. 
 48. See, e.g., Cowe v. Forum Group, Inc., 575 N.E.2d 630, 633 (Ind. 1991) (“An action for 
‘wrongful conception or pregnancy’ refers to a claim for damages sustained by the parents of an 
unexpected child alleging that the conception of the child resulted from negligent sterilization 
procedures or a defective contraceptive product.”). 
 49. Hensel, supra note 10, at 153. 
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award medical and emotional distress damages only for costs relating to 
pregnancy and delivery.50  The few courts that allow childrearing damages 
acknowledge the attendant public policy concerns, including newborns’ 
“silent interests,” “parent-child relationships,”51 and the psychological harm 
to the child who is “branded” an “‘emotional bastard.’”52  Traditionally and 
still, “most jurisdictions” let plaintiffs seek damages for wrongful 
pregnancy53 because, as the Supreme Court of Kentucky explained, to 
prohibit damages for this tort “would defy logic and be contrary to the 
concept of causation in tort.”54 
Parents also sue for false representation when pregnancy occurs after 
one wrongfully assures the other of infertility.55  In Moorman v. Walker,56 
for instance, a woman falsely told her boyfriend she was infertile after he 
“made it very clear” he did not want children out of wedlock.57  Rejecting 
the boyfriend’s suit for false representation after the woman conceived, the 
court expressed its practical and moral concerns: (1) a court cannot decide 
whether “the monetary cost of [a] life is worth more than its value”; (2) this 
claim facilitates the “unseemly spectacle” of parents disparaging their 
children; (3) public policy forbids parents from maximizing their awards by 
claiming “in open court” that their child’s existence is harmful; and (4) this 
claim “trivializes life itself.”58  Similarly, in C.A.M. v. R.A.W.,59 a New 
Jersey appellate court affirmed that parents of a “normal, healthy child” 
may not recover compensatory or punitive damages for false 
representation.60  Like McFarlane’s reasoning, C.A.M.’s emphasis on a 
normal, healthy child suggests that one with a disability may be 
compensable.61  In fact, in Szekeres v. Robinson,62 the Supreme Court of 
 
 50. See Anthony Jackson, Action for Wrongful Life, Wrongful Pregnancy, and Wrongful Birth 
in the United States and England, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 589 (1995) (stating 
that “of the thirty-six jurisdictions that allow wrongful pregnancy claims, twenty-eight deny 
damages for child-rearing as a matter of law”). 
 51. Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 177 (Minn. 1977). 
 52. See Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Toward Rational Boundaries of Tort Liability for Injury to 
the Unborn: Prenatal Injuries, Preconception Injuries and Wrongful Life, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1401, 
1449 (quoting Sherlock, 260 N.W.2d at 173). 
 53. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Graves, 314 S.E.2d 653, 654 (Ga. 1984). 
 54. Maggard v. McKelvey, 627 S.W.2d 44, 47 (Ky. 1981). 
 55. See, e.g., C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 556 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) 
(involving a father who falsely claimed he had undergone a vasectomy). 
 56. 773 P.2d 887 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989). 
 57. Id. at 888. 
 58. Id. at 889 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 59. 568 A.2d 556. 
 60. Id. at 563. 
 61. Compare id. with McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., (2000) 2 A.C. 59, 113–14 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Scot.) (declaring that parents of a “healthy” child may not recover childrearing 
costs because the “blessing” of a healthy child’s birth outweighs the costs of “parenthood”). 
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Nevada announced that although a “normal birth is not a wrong, it is a 
‘right,’”63 this conclusion applies only to healthy births and not necessarily 
to cases in which “medical negligence results in . . . genetic deformities and 
the like.”64 
Courts are generally inconsistent in their treatment of wrongful birth 
and wrongful life claims.  While many courts disregard the benefits of 
rearing children with genetic defects, other courts recognize them.65  In 
Gleitman v. Cosgrove,66 a physician incorrectly assured a pregnant woman 
with rubella that the virus would not affect her developing fetus, and the 
child was born with “substantial defects” in sight, hearing, and speech.67  
Arguing that they would have considered an abortion, the parents sued for 
wrongful birth, on behalf of themselves, and wrongful life, on behalf of 
their child.68  The Gleitman court rejected the wrongful birth claim, 
reasoning that judges cannot accurately weigh existential harm against the 
“complex human benefits” of parenthood and adding that “[a] child need 
not be perfect to have a worthwhile life.”69  The court also rejected the 
wrongful life claim, explaining that it could not weigh the child’s life with 
defects against “the utter void of nonexistence.”70   
Ten years later, in Becker v. Schwartz,71 a thirty-five-year-old woman 
who birthed a child with Down’s syndrome sued for wrongful birth and 
wrongful life, alleging that her physician neither warned her of age-related 
pregnancy risks nor recommended an amniocentesis.72  Like the Gleitman 
court, the Becker court rejected the wrongful life claim, declaring that only 
“the philosophers and the theologians” should decide whether nonexistence 
is better than life with “gross deficiencies.”73  But contrary to Gleitman, the 
 
 62. 715 P.2d 1076 (Nev. 1986). 
 63. Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). 
 64. Id. at 1078 n.3. 
 65. Hensel, supra note 10, at 154 (stating that courts’ rationales in cases involving healthy 
children “stand in contrast” to the rationales courts invoke “in the context of a child born with a 
genetic defect”). 
 66. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967). 
 67. Id. at 690.  The plaintiff’s expert testified that “women who have [rubella] in the first 
trimester of their pregnancy will produce infants with birth defects in 20 to 50 per cent of the 
cases.”  Id. 
 68. Id. at 691.  In a typical wrongful birth claim, parents sue for injuries allegedly resulting 
from the birth, whereas in a typical wrongful life claim, parents sue on behalf of the child with a 
disability, alleging that he or she would be better off not having been born at all.  Willis v. Wu, 
607 S.E.2d 63, 66 (S.C. 2004). 
 69. Gleitman, 227 A.2d at 693.  The court stated that “[t]he sanctity of the single human life is 
the decisive factor in this suit . . . .  We are not talking here about the breeding of prize cattle.”  Id. 
 70. Id. at 692. 
 71. 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978). 
 72. Id. at 808–09. 
 73. Id. at 812. 
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Becker court recognized the wrongful birth claim because the costs of 
childcare and treatment were calculable.74  The Becker court refused to 
permit recovery for psychological harm, deeming this calculation “too 
speculative” and noting that “parents may yet experience a love that even an 
abnormality cannot fully dampen.”75 
In line with Becker, most states have recognized wrongful birth claims 
but not wrongful life claims.76  In a precursor to wrongful life cases, 
Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton,77 Justice Holmes ruled that claims 
on behalf of children relating to prenatal injury were invalid because the 
unborn child was “part of the mother at the time of the injury, [and] any 
damage to it which was not too remote to be recovered for at all was 
recoverable by her . . . .”78  Later, in Walker v. Mart,79 a woman whose 
child had severe congenital defects sued her osteopathic physician for 
wrongful life for negligently performing prenatal tests to detect rubella.80  
Reasoning that children “have neither the ability nor the right” to decide 
existential questions, the Walker court rejected the wrongful life claim, 
adding that although an “overwhelming majority of jurisdictions” allow 
wrongful birth claims, only three allow wrongful life claims.81   
Indeed, some states cite public policy and judicial unmanageability as 
prohibiting both wrongful birth and wrongful life claims.  In Schork v. 
Huber,82 for example, the Supreme Court of Kentucky ruled that “[t]he 
establishment of a cause of action based on the matter of wrongful 
conception, wrongful life or wrongful birth is clearly within the purview of 
the legislature only.”83  Likewise, some state legislatures prohibit all claims 
 
 74. Id. at 813. 
 75. Id. at 814. 
 76. See Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208–09 n.9 (Colo. 1988) (noting the 
“overwhelming majority” of jurisdictions that recognize wrongful birth claims and citing various 
state cases and statutes in which courts have rejected wrongful life claims); see, e.g., Smith v. 
Cote, 513 A.2d 341, 355 (N.H. 1986) (recognizing wrongful birth claims but refusing to recognize 
wrongful life claims); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985) (same); Naccash v. 
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (Va. 1982) (recognizing wrongful birth claims); see also Speck v. 
Finegold, 408 A.2d 496, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (rejecting a wrongful life claim, reasoning that 
to determine “[w]hether it is better to have never been born at all rather than to have been born 
with serious mental defects . . . would lead us into the field of metaphysics, beyond the realm of 
our understanding or ability to solve”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 A.2d 110, 112 (Pa. 1981). 
 77. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).  But see Angelini v. OMD Corp., 575 N.E.2d 41, 44 (Mass. 1991) 
(noting that the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts abrogated Dietrich’s rule in Keyes v. 
Construction Service, Inc., 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960), which established that the administrator of a 
deceased child’s estate “could recover for wrongful death” in certain cases). 
 78. Id. at 17. 
 79. 790 P.2d 735 (Ariz. 1990). 
 80. Id. at 736. 
 81. Id. at 737 n.3, 738, 740. 
 82. 648 S.W.2d 861 (Ky. 1983).   
 83. Id. at 863. 
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asserting that “but for the negligent conduct of another,” the person “would 
have been aborted.”84 
In limited forms, however, several states still recognize wrongful life 
claims.85  In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories,86 a child born with 
Tay-Sachs disease sued a laboratory for wrongful life, alleging that it 
negligently failed to determine that both parents carried the mutation known 
to cause the disorder.87  The intermediate appellate court recognized the 
claim, reasoning that (1) “eugenic abortion” controls the “increasingly large 
part of the overall national health care burden” that genetic defects cause; 
(2) tort law helps “to avoid genetic disaster”; and (3) newborns with 
disabilities suffer compensable harm.88  Besides, the court added, tort law 
reflects the “basic changes in the way society views such matters.”89  In 
dicta, the court noted that its reasoning may support the claim of an 
“impaired infant” against her parents who, knowing of a prenatal defect, 
caused harm by allowing the child to be born.90  Two years later, the 
California Supreme Court affirmed the general validity of wrongful life 
claims, allowing courts to award non-general damages to compensate a 
“severely handicapped or suffering child” for medical care.91  New Jersey 
and Washington similarly allow wrongful life claims.92 
One scholar, Professor Hensel, notes that the “novelty” of reproductive 
torts has recently “worn off” due to expanded abortion rights and better 
prenatal genetic testing.93  Most states still allow wrongful birth claims to 
compensate for medical costs, deter medical negligence, and protect 
 
 84. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 188.130 (2008); see also 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-344 (2008) (prohibiting claims that “but for the act or omission of another, 
a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would have been aborted”). 
 85. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 
656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (in banc). 
 86. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980), overruled in part by Turpin, 643 P.2d at 965 
(affirming that a child with a disability may bring a wrongful life claim in California, but 
overruling the Curlender court’s decision to allow that child to recover “general damages”). 
 87. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 480–81. 
 88. Id. at 487–88 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Several courts have 
invoked the third reason.  See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254 (Ill. 
1977) (noting the view that “the embryo, from the moment of conception, is a separate organism 
that can be compensated for negligently inflicted prenatal harm”); Watt v. Rama (1972) V.R. 353, 
377 (Austl.) (stating, in dicta, that “[d]isease and trauma happening at any time from the womb to 
the tomb apparently can affect one’s well-being and future health”). 
 89. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 487. 
 90. Id. at 488.  The California legislature immediately passed a law to protect parents against 
such liability.  CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.6 (WEST 2007). 
 91. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 961–62, 966. 
 92. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (N.J. 1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 
656 P.2d 483, 497 (Wash. 1983). 
 93. Hensel, supra note 10, at 160. 
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parental autonomy.94  The opposing minority of states rejects these claims, 
often on grounds of institutional incompetence.95  The Supreme Court of 
Georgia, for instance, explained that because the “problems presented by 
the concept of ‘wrongful birth’ actions can only become increasingly more 
numerous and more complex,” only the legislature should tackle them.96  
For the same reasons, the Supreme Court of North Carolina ruled that 
“neither claims for wrongful birth nor claims for wrongful life are 
cognizable at law in this jurisdiction.”97  Besides, Professor Hensel argues, 
“wrongful birth and wrongful life actions result in equally anti-therapeutic 
consequences for people with disabilities.”98 
The jurisdictional splits, diverse legal concerns, and conflicting 
preferences that characterize American reproductive tort jurisprudence 
reveal the challenges that judges face when making legal decisions that are 
also declarations of moral policy. 
C.  Courts Perpetuate Stigmatizing Stereotypes by Sustaining False 
Dichotomies Between Healthy Children and Children with 
Disabilities 
The underlying message of the judiciary and legislature reveals that 
society’s “physiological model of ‘normality’” still excludes people with 
disabilities, and that this model governs public discourse.99  Despite the 
progressive ideas giving rise to the ADA, the disability rights movement, 
and the minority-group model of disability, the blessing-burden distinction 
persists.  Lord Steyn, in McFarlane, ruled that the United Kingdom’s “tort 
law does not permit parents of a healthy . . . child” to recover childrearing 
costs from a negligent physician.100  The C.A.M. court ruled that the parents 
of a normal, healthy baby were not entitled to compensatory or punitive 
damages.101  The Szekeres court “t[ook] the trouble” to declare that 
although a “normal birth is not a wrong,” the birth of a baby with “genetic 
deformities and the like” may be legally compensable.102  The Curlender 
court suggested that “defectively born” children are compensable “genetic 
 
 94. Id. at 160–61. 
 95. See, e.g., Schork v. Huber, 648 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Ky. 1983) (refusing to recognize a 
wrongful birth claim, explaining that only the legislature can establish this cause of action). 
 96. Atlanta Obstetrics & Gynecology Group v. Abelson, 398 S.E.2d 557, 563 (Ga. 1990). 
 97. Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 337 S.E.2d 528, 537 (N.C. 1985). 
 98. Hensel, supra note 10, at 170. 
 99. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 54. 
 100. McFarlane v. Tayside Health Bd., (2000) 2 A.C. 59, 83 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.) 
(emphasis added). 
 101. C.A.M. v. R.A.W., 568 A.2d 556, 563 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). 
 102. Szekeres v. Robinson, 715 P.2d 1076, 1078 & n.3 (Nev. 1986). 
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disaster[s]” that burden the health care system.103  As Professor Priaulx 
highlights, “disability seems to be all about real bodies that are physically, 
sensorily or intellectually different in undesirable ways.”104 
In light of these judicial proclamations, the financial benefits of 
reproductive tort claims105 “come at great expense” to people living with 
disabilities for three reasons.106  Principally, the rhetoric of litigation tends 
to ignore “attitudinal discrimination” and to characterize members of 
society as the “protectors, guides and spokespersons for disabled 
citizens.”107  First, a judicial opinion in a wrongful birth or wrongful life 
case is often a “community pronouncement, via a government institution,” 
that an impaired life is worse than nonexistence.108  This “state-sanctioned 
message” is an important policy declaration109 and a “key societal signifier” 
because public perceptions of harm are “closely linked” to the law.110  
Thus, when McFarlane and Curlender announced that a healthy newborn is 
a blessing and an unhealthy one is a harm, they sanctioned society to do the 
same.111  Insurance companies, health providers, and private enterprises, 
for example, could rely on these judicial messages to justify denying 
support to parents who refuse to abort fetuses with known genetic 
defects.112  Second, de facto, reproductive tort claims compel parents either 
to deny themselves needed compensation or to “disavow [their children’s] 
very existence in open court.”113  This non-choice raises broader policy 
questions: 
 
 103. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487–88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 104. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 54 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 105. See Deana A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis in Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 327, 336 (2004) (noting financial support and deterrence of misconduct among these 
benefits). 
 106. Hensel, supra note 10, at 171. 
 107. See Harlan Hahn, Feminist Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and 
Agendas, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 97, 106–07 (1994) (noting that courts have 
generally ignored harmful societal attitudes). 
 108. Hensel, supra note 10, at 173. 
 109. Id. 
 110. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 38 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 111. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 174 (positing that “[j]udicial recognition” of wrongful birth 
and wrongful life claims “is akin to a state-sanctioned acknowledgement that [society] . . . may 
legitimately evaluate whether an individual with impairments has a rightful place in the 
community”). 
 112. Id. at 180–81.  Professor Hensel notes that, unlike non-reproductive tort rulings that favor 
plaintiffs, which all “in some respect endorse the value of the plaintiff’s life,” wrongful birth and 
wrongful life rulings “negate[]” the value of the plaintiff’s life.  Id. at 175–76. 
 113. Id. at 172.  “The anti-therapeutic consequences” of this parental announcement in open 
court are “amplified, since the disparagement is voiced from within the community of people with 
disabilities and cannot be discounted by others as mere ignorance or prejudice.”  Id. at 173.  
Indeed, malpractice litigation is often “highly public.”  Edward A. Dauer, A Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence Perspective on Legal Responses to Medical Error, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 37, 38 
(2003). 
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Why should playmates’ parents, the neighbors, or the schools 
change to incorporate existing children with disabilities if 
families and . . . government . . . work as hard as they do to avoid 
the births of people who will have these conditions?  Where do 
we first learn justice, sharing, and cooperation, but in the 
family?114   
Third, because parents must now decide both how many children they 
want and what kind of children they do not want, stereotypes that courts 
inadvertently reinforce affect whether people with disabilities are “born at 
all.”115 
Finally, judicial opinions may acutely affect adults living with 
disabilities and families raising children with disabilities.  To many adults 
with disabilities, even non-tortious prenatal testing signals that “the world 
would be better off without [them] alive” and makes them “feel devalued as 
human beings.”116  Indeed, prenatal testing implies that society would 
rather “solve” disabilities than make society amenable to them.117  In 
certain cultures, in fact, public positions regarding disability directly affect 
societal and familial well-being.  For example, a British government 
program seeking to identify the carriers of Maple Syrup Urine Disease in a 
Bedouin tribe caused nearly every male to seek a wife outside the tribe, 
resulting in a population of unmarried Bedouin women.118  One disability 
scholar declared that “[w]e in the disability rights community resist the 
notion that our humanness can be evaluated and then reduced to a flawed 
gene.”119  Thus, according to Professor Hensel, the legal recognition of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims is “akin to a public endorsement of 
eugenic abortion in lieu of . . . life with disabilities.”120 
Insensitive jurisprudence may also yield moral, emotional, and 
financial hardships for parents contemplating abortion.  In Curlender’s 
jurisdiction, for example, parents who choose to have a child despite a 
genetic defect know they have legally harmed their child.121  Indeed, the 
 
 114. Adrienne Asch, Why I Haven’t Changed My Mind about Prenatal Diagnosis, in 
PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS 234, 251 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 
2000). 
 115. Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 961 (Cal. 1982) (in banc). 
 116. Marsha Saxton, Why Members of the Disability Community Oppose Prenatal Diagnosis 
and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 160. 
 117. Asch, supra note 114, at 240. 
 118. Mairi Levitt, A Sociological Perspective on Genetic Screening, in THE ETHICS OF 
GENETIC SCREENING 157, 160 (Ruth Chadwick et al. eds., 1999). 
 119. Saxton, supra note 116, at 161. 
 120. Hensel, supra note 10, at 177. 
 121. See Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (identifying 
“no sound public policy which should protect those parents from being answerable for the pain, 
suffering and misery” they visit on their newborns); see also Adrienne Asch, Reproductive 
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Curlender court “did not merely hint” that these parents should be 
answerable,122 morally and at law, “for the pain, suffering, and misery 
which they have wrought upon their offspring.”123  At least one scholar 
agrees with Curlender that “[i]n some cases it might be possible to say that 
the parents have made a ‘poor’ decision and have wronged the child” by 
carrying her to term.124  Other cost-benefit scholars have weighed the price 
of state-wide genetic screening programs against the burden of raising 
children with impairments.125  Even the National Institutes of Health has 
promoted “genetic counseling” to help solve the “problems” of genetic 
conditions.126  Because these pronouncements deeply affect lives and 
reinforce controversial policies, courts should use restraint when drafting 
their judicial opinions. 
III.  JUDICIAL OPINIONS THAT PRESERVE TRADITIONAL TORT 
MECHANISMS WHILE ACCURATELY CONCEPTUALIZING “DISABILITY” 
AND “HARM” PROTECT THE LEGAL INTERESTS OF LITIGANTS AND 
PROMOTE A MORE TRUTHFUL PERCEPTION OF THE DISABILITY 
COMMUNITY 
Some scholars argue that, due to the prohibitively high social costs of 
wrongful birth and wrongful life claims, “neither action should be 
recognized by state legislatures or the courts.”127  But the objective 
reasonably prudent person standard supporting these claims “is deeply 
ingrained in common law.”128  Because states are unlikely to abolish 
reproductive tort claims that deter medical negligence and compensate 
families, courts should take practical steps to write judicial opinions that 
reflect and promote an accurate understanding of disability.129  In so doing, 
courts can compensate families and avoid perpetuating harmful false 
 
Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990S 69, 88 (Sherrill Cohen & 
Nadine Taub eds., 1989) (stating that where genetic tests yield diagnoses of spina bifida, cystic 
fibrosis, or Down’s syndrome, people generally believe that “failure to abort is cruel to the 
potential child, destructive to the family, socially irresponsible, and possibly immoral”). 
 122. Hensel, supra note 10, at 177–78. 
 123. Curlender, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. 
 124. Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life 
Dilemma?, 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 185, 241–42 (1993). 
 125. See, e.g., Gwen Anderson, Nondirectiveness in Prenatal Genetics: patients read between 
the lines, 6 NURSING ETHICS 126, 130 (1999). 
 126. Genetic Disorders Causing Mental Retardation, 23 NIH GUIDE, Feb. 18, 1994, available 
at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/pa-files/PA-94-037.html. 
 127. See Hensel, supra note 10, at 144–45 (identifying the impaired psychological well-being 
of people with disabilities and the negative public image of disability as two social costs of 
reproductive tort litigation). 
 128. Mark A. Rothstein, Legal Conceptions of Equality in the Genomic Age, 25 LAW & INEQ. 
429, 439 (2007). 
 129. See infra Part III.A.   
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dichotomies,130 while yielding net benefits to all parties involved in 
reproductive tort cases.131   
A.  Courts Should Contextualize Their Understanding of Disability and 
Harm to Accommodate Families’ Diverse Experiences and to 
Convey Accurate Information About Litigants 
Courts adjudicating wrongful birth and wrongful life cases should 
aggressively monitor the implicit messages their opinions send to litigants, 
neighborhoods, and families.  Indeed, mere euphemisms for wrongful birth, 
which one court tried to implement, are insufficient.132  Courts should 
instead avoid false bright lines between “healthy” and “disabled” by 
focusing on familial context, appropriate models of harm and disability, and 
the potential social effects of their rulings. 
By relying on the rigid medical model of disability, some courts have 
perpetuated the belief that families of children with disabilities are crippled, 
whereas families of healthy children are blessed.133  Just eight years ago, 
for instance, a British judge in Lee v. Taunton134 announced that “I do not 
believe that it would be right for the law to deem the birth of a disabled 
child to be a blessing.”135  Likewise, in Rand v. East Dorset Health 
Authority,136 the same court declared that the blessings and hardships of 
living with a substantially “disabled” child are “difficult to discern.”137  
Despite these signals that health is the opposite of disability,138 our 
experiences suggest otherwise. 
Bright lines between health and disability generally obscure the 
diverse experiences of families, assume that disability connotes misfortune, 
and disregard the “distinct biographies [and] different social circumstances, 
priorities and emotional make-ups” of litigants.139  Lord Justice Wallace of 
 
 130. See infra Part III.B.   
 131. See infra Part III.C.   
 132. See Garrison v. Med. Ctr. of Del., Inc., 581 A.2d 288, 290 (Del. 1989) (stating that a 
claim for medical malpractice for a negligently performed prenatal chromosome study “need not 
be characterized as ‘wrongful birth’ since it falls within the realm of traditional tort and medical 
malpractice law”). 
 133. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 56 (noting courts’ proclamations that “caring for a 
disabled child is harmful and sufficiently distinctive from the (judicially viewed harmless) 
experience of caring for a non-disabled child”). 
 134. (2001) 1 F.L.R. 419 (Q.B.D.). 
 135. Nicolette Priaulx, Health, Disability & Parental Interests: Adopting a Contextual 
Approach in the Reproductive Torts, 12 EUR. J. HEALTH L. 213, 219 (2005) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 136. (2000) 56 B.M.L.R. 39 (Q.B.D.). 
 137. Id. at 49. 
 138. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 56. 
 139. Priaulx, supra note 135, at 229. 
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the Court of Appeal of England articulated these concerns through the 
following hypothetical in his dissenting opinion in a recent wrongful birth 
case.140  Compare a healthy mother who has four children but no familial 
support to a mother “who is disabled” but who also has a loving and 
supportive husband, siblings, parents, and friends, “all willing to help.”141  
“[O]rdinary people,” Lord Justice Wallace submits, “would feel 
uncomfortable about the thought that it was simply the disability which 
made a difference.”142  One scholar echoes this point: “[o]ne set of parents 
may give birth to a perfectly healthy baby that ends up living a miserable 
life of depression and social ostracism, while another set may give birth to a 
disabled child who turns out to be the next Helen Keller, a figure of success 
and inspiration.”143  Besides, “the same [disabling] condition can be seen in 
one country as a curse and in another as a blessing.”144  Certain Southeast 
Asian cultures, for instance, believe that people with blindness “possess[] a 
certain valued insight,” and the Tswana culture deems children with 
disabilities “gifts from God.”145  Plainly, every parent experiences 
hardships and happiness in different ratios and diverse ways according to 
their unique circumstances.146 
But when judicial opinions become “constant reminders” that 
disabilities are actionable harms, courts risk causing “chronic sorrow” in 
families147 and promulgating “pathologising assumptions” about the effects 
of disability.148  To avoid an inaccurate “value-judgment . . . that the lives 
of the handicapped are worth . . . less than those of a ‘normal’ person 
[sic],”149 courts should examine harm and disability in a familial and 
cultural context. 
Particularly in reproductive tort cases, the importance of context and 
the danger of bright lines are even more acute and personal than Lord 
Wallace suggested.  By rigidly defining disability and discounting “the 
 
 140. See Rees v. Darlington Mem’l Hosp. NHS Trust, (2003) 3 W.L.R. 1091, 1106 (H.L.). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Sophie Zhang, The Morality of Having Children with Disabilities: A Different Perspective 
on Happiness and Quality of Life, 8 MGGILL J. MED. 85, 87 (2004). 
 144. Id. at 85. 
 145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. See Simo Vehmas, Parental Responsibility and the Morality of Selective Abortion, 5 
ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 463, 472 (2002) (“When considering the parenting of a child 
with a cognitive impairment, people seem to forget the fact [that] every child is more or less a 
burden to her parents.”). 
 147. See Margaret F. Copley & John B. Bodensteiner, Chronic Sorrow in Families of Disabled 
Children, 2 J. CHILD NEUROL. 67, 69 (1987). 
 148. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 70 (stating that “the courts have . . . embraced a purely 
medical model of disability”). 
 149. Jackson, supra note 50, at 607. 
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context of family, community, and the individual as a whole person,” many 
courts largely disregard the possibility that people with disabilities can lead 
happy, meaningful lives.150  Specifically, when parents learn that their child 
will have a disability, the “ultimate impact” of the defect remains largely 
unknown.151  The experiences of disability, even among those with the 
same condition, vary dramatically depending on familial support, financial 
resources, and unknown biological factors.152  A child with cystic fibrosis, 
for instance, “might die from it, survive with physical disability, or suffer 
no noticeable impairment”;153 a child with Down’s syndrome may suffer 
severe mental impairment or may sustain a job and meaningful 
relationships;154 and a child with spina bifida may grow up crippled in a 
broken home or may lead a happy life.155  An extraordinary example of the 
value of context to the judicial perception of disability is Alison Davis, who 
was born with Myelomeningocele Spina Bifida and explains: 
Despite my disability and the gloomy predictions made by 
doctors at my birth, I am now leading a very full, happy and 
satisfying life by any standards.  I am most definitely glad to be 
alive.  Yet, because handicapped people are now presumed by . . . 
doctors, [courts,] philosophers and Society in general to have the 
capacity only for being miserable and an economic burden on the 
community most of those who would otherwise grow up to be 
like me are now aborted or “allowed to die” . . . at birth.156 
Elsewhere, Ms. Davis has stated that “I am an ordinary human being, 
who simply has disabilities which are more obvious than those of the 
majority.  I believe my life . . . to be of infinite value, not valuable only if it 
achieves a particular ‘quality.’”157 
 
 150. Hensel, supra note 10, at 182–83 (noting that notions of disability are “reduced to the 
least common denominator of organistic functioning and focus exclusively on internally rather 
than externally imposed barriers”). 
 151. See id. at 183.  Generally, at this time, only “the identification of the defect itself and its 
possible parameters” are known.  Id. 
 152. See Zhang, supra note 143, at 86 (offering examples of people with severe disabilities 
who live happy and prosperous lives). 
 153. Larson, supra note 9, at 922. 
 154. Hensel, supra note 10, at 183. 
 155. Zhang, supra note 143, at 86 (describing the life of Alison Davis, who earned a university 
degree, married, became a well-known disability-rights activist and claims to have enjoyed a “full 
and happy life” despite suffering from a severe form of spina bifida that has left her incontinent 
and wheelchair bound). 
 156. Hensel, supra note 10, at 183–84 (quoting Alison Davis, Yes, the Baby Should Live, 31 
NEW SCIENTIST 54 (1985)). 
 157. Alison Davis, A Disabled Person’s Perspective on Pre-Natal Screening 9 (March 30, 
1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Leeds Centre for Disability 
Studies), available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/disability-
studies/archiveuk/Davis/A%20Disabled%20Person.pdf. 
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In light of circumstances like those of Ms. Davis’s, courts should 
replace their bright-line “categories of disability and health as indicators of 
harmful (or harmless) reproductive outcomes” with a non-dichotomous 
approach that considers lived experiences.158  This approach should (1) 
consider the burdens that accompany all parenting; (2) reinforce the 
minority-group model of disability; and (3) emphasize that the “harm” of 
disability varies greatly depending on biological, familial, financial, 
attitudinal, and social factors.  One judicial attempt to implement these 
features is the special-damages model, which the following section 
describes. 
B.  Courts Should Take Practical Steps to Implement a Contextual 
Reproductive Tort Jurisprudence that Compensates Families and 
Avoids False Dichotomies 
To feasibly rid reproductive tort litigation of harmful dichotomies, 
contextualize judicial decision-making, and adopt the minority-group 
model, courts must not unrealistically weaken traditional tort processes.  
The reproductive tort cases of the United States, Great Britain, and 
elsewhere show “how far negligence law has come adrift of principle.”159  
In fact, one scholar has called for “a much hoped for quiet u-turn with good 
grace and no loss of face” in the jurisprudence of reproductive torts.160  But 
because states are unlikely to flatly eliminate wrongful birth claims and 
because a dramatic overhaul of the tort system is improbable, this Essay 
recommends restrained, incremental steps. 
To accommodate reproductive tort claimants while avoiding 
stigmatizing dichotomies, courts should shift from blessing-harm 
dichotomies to analyses based upon causation and “the needs of the 
living.”161  A useful model for this approach is a 1984 decision from the 
New Jersey Supreme Court that validated a wrongful life claim but 
implemented a special damages scheme.162  In Procanik v. Cillo, an infant 
sued for wrongful life, alleging that a doctor’s negligent failure to diagnose 
his mother’s rubella in the first trimester of her pregnancy caused his birth, 
which congenital rubella syndrome impaired.163  Avoiding health-disability 
and blessing-harm dichotomies, the Procanik court adopted a “special 
 
 158. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 70. 
 159. See Laura C.H. Hoyano, Misconceptions about Wrongful Conception, 65 MOD. L. REV. 
883, 892 (2002). 
 160. Priaulx, supra note 135, at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 161. See Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (N.J. 1984) (deciding a reproductive tort case 
“predicated on the needs of the living”). 
 162. Id. at 764. 
 163. Id. at 758. 
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damages” approach to compensate the child for the “extraordinary medical 
expenses attributable to his affliction.”164  Recognizing that certain social 
factors were “beyond judicial competence” to evaluate,165 the court refused 
to grant “general” damages for emotional distress or for an impaired 
childhood.166  For five reasons, the court explained, this “special damages” 
rule was superior to traditional approaches: (1) both parents and children 
experience the burdens of costly medical care;167 (2) the special damages 
approach recognizes that medical negligence “vitally affects the entire 
family”;168 (3) courts can readily calculate special damages;169 (4) 
restricting damage awards to “special” damages avoids the “philosophical” 
problems posed by wrongful life claims;170 and (5) a child’s claim should 
not depend on whether his parents are available to sue.171  Crucially, the 
court’s decision “is not premised on the concept that non-life is preferable 
to an impaired life, but is predicated on the needs of the living.”172 
Procanik represents a vital shift in both premise and reasoning—a 
departure from the blessing-harm dichotomy and movement toward a 
contextual jurisprudence that accounts for the social, financial, and moral 
concerns of families, people with disabilities, and communities.  Emphasis 
on the needs of the living, recognition that certain questions are not 
judicable, application of a creative damages scheme, and attention to 
context rather than “genetic disaster,” are practical steps courts can take to 
revise their reproductive tort jurisprudence. 
C.  Although a Contextual, Non-Dichotomous Approach to 
Reproductive Tort Jurisprudence May Undermine the Effectiveness 
of Claimants’ Traditional Litigation Techniques, It Will Likely 
Yield Net Benefits to All Interested Parties 
Although a jurisprudence that frames a “vision of justice” in “needs 
and realities” may avoid stereotypes,173 it also may weaken parents’ 
abilities to recover damages and may run counter to traditional adversarial 
 
 164. Id. at 757.  The Supreme Court of California adopted a similar special damages approach 
in Turpin v. Sortini to avoid some of the policy concerns of traditional wrongful life jurisprudence.  
643 P.2d 954, 965 (Cal. 1982) (in banc). 
 165. Procanik, 478 A.2d at 761. 
 166. Id. at 763. 
 167. Id. at 762. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 761. 
 170. Id. at 762–63. 
 171. Id. at 762 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172. Id. at 763.  The Procanik court announced that it seeks “only to respond to the call of the 
living for help in bearing the burden of their affliction.”  Id. 
 173. See PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 157–58. 
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processes.  If a mother does not testify in open court that her newborn with 
an unexpected genetic defect has caused “harm,” will a jury award high 
damages?  If a plaintiff’s lawyer does not aggressively distinguish a healthy 
child from an impaired one, will the tort system adequately compensate the 
client?  If parents do not highlight the heavy burdens that arise from 
children’s disabilities, can reproductive tort claims address the needs of the 
living?  Because tort practice is meant to summon the sympathy of jurors by 
drawing clear distinctions, replacing a dichotomous approach with a 
contextual one may correct social misperceptions at the expense of parents’ 
financial needs. 
Professor Priaulx notes that although a contextual approach is 
“essential if we are committed to embracing and responding to” families’ 
“diverse experiences of reproduction,” it is difficult to weaken dichotomies 
without weakening the adversarial process.174  Although Procanik 
promotes a shift in judicial focus toward the needs of the living, Professor 
Priaulx doubts whether courts can construct a “linguistic framework of 
need” that is as viable as the linguistic framework of harm.175  Unlike 
“rights” and “harms,” which cause juries to assign responsibility, needs are 
“not straightforwardly prescriptive.”176  Thus, while a contextual, needs-
based approach may “sound less adversarial,”177 it also may prevent 
plaintiffs from doing what is traditionally necessary to maximize damages: 
drawing bright lines between blessings and harms; showing the high 
financial costs of caring for ill children; and persuading the jury that your 
family is suffering with an imperfect child.  Indeed, “[t]he scientific ability 
to draw fine distinctions among people based on genetic variation”178 
parallels a plaintiff’s lawyer’s ability to draw fine distinctions that vividly 
portray harm.  Compared to the harm-based rhetoric on which reproductive 
tort claimants traditionally rely to sway juries, this language of needs 
“might . . . easily collapse.”179  So while a contextual, needs-based 
approach might “carry less . . . baggage” than a dichotomous, harm-based 
approach, a judicial shift that suppresses distinctions and trivializes harm 
could diminish damage awards.180 
 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id.  Professor Priaulx asks, “How might our claim look?  A right or responsibility to have 
one’s need fulfilled?  Or a need to have one’s needs recognised [sic]?”  Id. at 157.  Professor 
Priaulx argues that although the needs-framework is “initially compelling,” it does not “stand up 
to closer scrutiny.”  Id. 
 176. Jeremy Waldron, The Role of Rights in Practical Reasoning: “Rights” versus “Needs,” 4 
J. ETHICS 115, 121 (2000). 
 177. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 158. 
 178. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 435. 
 179. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 158. 
 180. Id. 
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Although a contextual approach may weaken claimants’ 
persuasiveness and lessen monetary awards, it may have substantial net 
benefits.  Given the diversity of sensitive interests at stake—families’ 
financial needs, the social equality of the disability community, judicial 
administrability, etc.—courts must holistically evaluate the positive effects 
of a contextual approach.  Under a special damages approach, for instance, 
wrongful birth claimants can leave the courtroom without the shame of 
having disparaged their newborns in open court.  Lawmakers and 
community-members can witness or read about reproductive tort cases 
without receiving judicial messages that people with disabilities are less 
valuable.  Insurance companies, local and national policymakers, 
employers, and service-providers may follow judges’ leads and begin to 
better accommodate the disability community.  Thus, while a non-
dichotomous jurisprudence may slightly diminish damage awards, it may 
grant significant net benefits to all interested parties. 
IV.  BECAUSE LEGAL AUTONOMY IN REPRODUCTIVE DECISION-MAKING 
DOES NOT NECESSARILY YIELD ACTUAL PARENTAL REPRODUCTIVE 
FREEDOM, COURTS MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE SOCIAL 
CONSTRAINTS ON PARENTAL CHOICE 
The search for a reproductive tort jurisprudence that protects both the 
disability community and the tort system raises important questions about 
parental autonomy.  Is the gap between legal reproductive autonomy and 
actual reproductive freedom growing?  Are reproductive choices really free 
choices when society legalizes prenatal options but, de facto, embraces only 
one option?  In addition to contextualizing their notions of harm and 
disability, judges should also contextualize their understanding of parental 
choice, especially in a social climate that practically limits that choice. 
Simultaneously, new medical technology expands and constrains 
parental reproductive choices.  On the one hand, contraceptive devices let 
women plan their pregnancies; genetic testing helps couples decide whether 
to abort their fetuses; alternative methods of managing labor and delivery 
give women a say in the birthing process; and in vitro fertilization, embryo 
transfer, and artificial insemination allow couples to “circumvent their 
infertility.”181  On the other hand, the effects of reproductive technologies 
are not understandable “in a vacuum.”182  Reproductive choice does not 
 
 181. Aila Collins & Judith Rodin, The New Reproductive Technologies: What Have We 
Learned?, in WOMEN & NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: MEDICAL, PSYCHOSOCIAL, 
LEGAL, AND ETHICAL DILEMMAS 153, 153–54 (Judith Rodin & Aila Collins eds., 1991). 
 182. Barbara K. Rothman, The Tentative Pregnancy: Then and Now, in WOMEN & PRENATAL 
TESTING: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF GENETIC TECHNOLOGY 260, 264 (Karen H. Rothenberg 
& Elizabeth J. Thomson eds., 1994). 
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entail freedom of choice if new technologies, “subterranean political 
ideologies,” and “hidden arguments” beneath the “surface language of 
neutrality”183 in the medical, social, and legal communities heavily 
influence decision-making.  Despite these “constraints on the choice” to use 
or not use prenatal testing, to have or not have an abortion in an “at risk” 
pregnancy,184 and to sue or not sue for wrongful birth or wrongful life, 
judicial decisions tend to rely heavily on parents’ reproductive decisions.185 
A.  The Social Origins of the Reasonable Person Standard, Sameness 
Model of Equality, and Increasingly Patriarchal Perception of 
Pregnancy Constrain Parents’ Reproductive Choices 
Parents must make reproductive decisions in the context of three 
categories of social constraint.  First, reproductive decisions are “social 
decisions”186 and judicial standards arise from those social standards.  
Specifically, the reasonably prudent person test—a “flexible, easily 
understandable”187 standard meant to compensate reproductive tort victims, 
fairly allocate costs, and deter misconduct188—has substantial 
undercurrents of social context.189  Professor Rothstein notes that this 
standard “reflects a pre-industrial, agrarian view that all men had a basic 
skill set,” including the abilities to build homes, tend to animals, and 
respond to physical threats.190  Thus, the reasonably prudent person is the 
“personification of a community ideal of reasonable behavior,”191 which is 
likely why the Curlender court noted that tort law reflects the “basic 
changes in the way society views [reproductive tort] matters.”192  Because 
the reasonably prudent person standard seeks to approximate a singular 
behavioral ideal, courts use contextual, “individualized” standards 
infrequently—“only when the differences are obvious.”193  And since 
“[e]quality of opportunity” was not “part of the doctrinal development” of 
 
 183. TROY DUSTER, BACKDOOR TO EUGENICS 113, 129 (1990); see also infra Part IV.A. 
 184. Rothman, supra note 182, at 260. 
 185. See infra Part IV.B.   
 186. Rothman, supra note 182, at 267.  In fact, Professor Rothman says that these decisions are 
“never ‘medical’ decisions.”  Id. 
 187. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 437. 
 188. Id. at 438. 
 189. See id. at 438–39.  This standard, originally called the “reasonable man” standard, came 
about in nineteenth-century England.  Id. at 437. 
 190. Id. at 438.  Professor Rothstein notes that, as a result of these views, courts assumed there 
was “a narrow range of social variability among individuals,” an assumption that is “no longer 
true.”  Id. 
 191. Id. at 437. 
 192. Curlender v. Bio-Sci. Labs., 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 487 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). 
 193. Rothstein, supra note 128, at 439. 
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tort law,194 courts often disregard it.  Thus, both parental and judicial 
choices in reproductive tort claims are always strained through the sieve of 
a legal system that social factors heavily influence. 
Second, contextualized notions of equality affect the reproductive 
choices of parents, courts, and communities.  Professor Rothstein has 
recently assessed how the legal conception of equality might require change 
“as scientists perfect the ability to identify individual variations at the 
genetic level.”195  Currently, the law restricting genetic discrimination and 
the law restricting other discrimination are based upon opposing principles 
of equality.  While the ADA is based upon a “‘difference’ model which 
requires an individualized determination of fitness,”196 genetic 
nondiscrimination statutes are based on the “civil rights model of 
‘sameness.’”197  This sameness model, some feminist scholars argue, uses 
the “lens of the dominant group”198 and thus treats social minorities “as if” 
they were the majority.199  Consequently, parents and courts must decide 
life-changing reproductive matters in the context of a sameness legal model 
that belies the reality of genetic diversity.200  Recognizing this concern, one 
scholar advocates “replacing” the sameness model with one that respects 
“individual differences.”201 
Third, changing views of pregnancy may affect parental, judicial, and 
societal decisions regarding people with disabilities.  Expressly, Professor 
Rothman points out, genetic technology “reconstructs pregnancy in men’s 
image.”202  Professor Rothman explains that while pregnancy is a process 
of separation for women,203 it is a process of delivery for men.204  In two 
main ways, genetic technology advances this patriarchal, “outside” view of 
 
 194. Id. at 438.  Professor Rothstein points out that tort law “does not consider minor 
variations” in peoples’ character and capabilities.  Id. at 437.  Age, disability, “special talents,” 
and “training” are some of the few “exceptions” that give rise to an individualized standard 
because, in those cases, the differences are overt.  Id. 
 195. Id. at 455. 
 196. Id. at 447. 
 197. See id. at 456 (noting that this “sameness” model is inappropriate for genetic diversity). 
 198. Id. at 457 (citing MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, 
EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 56 (1990)).  Professor Rothstein notes that in the United States, 
this dominant group is “white males.”  Id. 
 199. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 200. See id. at 456 (“The civil rights model of ‘sameness’ and the fiction that ‘all difference is 
irrelevant’ are inappropriate legal models for genetic diversity.”).  Professor Rothstein adds that 
justifications for the sameness model are rapidly fading.  Id. at 458. 
 201. Id. at 462. 
 202. Rothman, supra note 182, at 262.  Professor Rothman asserts that “[g]enetic technology 
changes the very way in which we think about pregnancy.”  Id. 
 203. Id. at 262–63.  Professor Rothman states that pregnancy is the process by which “part of 
[the woman] goes on to become someone else.”  Id. at 263. 
 204. Id. at 263. 
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pregnancy: (1) “[c]onceptually, the fetus becomes a potential patient to be 
tested”; and (2) “physically, a preimplantation diagnosis manipulates the 
material that will become the baby in a procedure conducted outside of the 
woman’s body.”205  According to Professor Rothman, the effects of this 
patriarchal pregnancy model on women’s reproductive choices “are now 
coming to haunt us.”206  In particular, genetic technology advances the 
notion that pregnancy is a “contractual agreement” between a woman and 
the “controllers” of the prenatal genetic material.207  As society comes to 
view women as “site[s] for [fetal] implantation,” women are increasingly 
“subjected to social control” by those with expanded access to and interest 
in prenatal genetic material.208 
B.  Judicial Decisions Give Heavy Weight to Parental Reproductive 
Decisions Even Though Social Factors Substantially Restrain 
Parental Freedom of Choice 
In light of the social, political, and legal contexts of parental 
reproductive decision-making, Professor Rothman finds the “language of 
individual choice untenable.”209  Although genetic technology lets women 
“choose” whether to birth a child with a disability, women “are not given 
choices about the environment in which that child would live.”210  When a 
woman chooses to abort her fetus that has a genetic defect, she does so “in a 
world that sets the parameters of that child’s life just as surely as genes 
do.”211  Other scholars agree that new genetic technologies “may serve to 
reduce choice” because (1) these technologies carry unanticipated 
emotional costs; (2) “the availability of prenatal testing” pressures women 
to “submit to screening”; and (3) the possibility of genetic abnormality 
“casts its shadow” over the early months of pregnancy.212   
These facets of parental choice directly affect judicial decision-making 
in reproductive tort cases.  In wrongful conception and wrongful birth 
 
 205. Id.  As a result, the “technology we have developed and continue to develop reifies a male 
notion of pregnancy, of the making of babies.”  Id. 
 206. Id. at 263–64. 
 207. Id. at 264.  These “controllers” may be the father, the government, the laboratory, or the 
potential adopters.  Id. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 267. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id.  Notably, Professor Rothman states that abortion “can be the right choice, the moral 
choice, the only choice, but it, like birthing the child, is always a choice in a context.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
 212. Collins & Rodin, supra note 181, at 154–55.  Professor Rothman has labeled the latter 
phenomenon the “tentative pregnancy.”  Id. at 154.  Some scholars question these views, noting 
the distinction between a difficult choice and no choice at all.  PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 153–54 
(citation omitted). 
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cases, for instance, courts typically “scrutini[ze]” the claimants’ decisions 
and hold the claimants partly responsible for reproductive risks,213 even if 
social pressures heavily influenced those decisions.  Whether through 
“formal notions of causation, mitigation or not,” Professor Priaulx argues, 
courts regard parental conduct as the “prime mover” in generating 
damages.214  Professor Priaulx observes that “both abortion and adoption 
continue to be used as sociolegal tools” in judicial decision-making because 
courts fail to fully account for social pressures on reproductive choice.215  
Potentially, a shift in the legal and societal conceptions of tort, equality, and 
pregnancy would allow women’s legal choices to better approximate their 
freedom of choice and would give courts a more sound conceptual context 
in which to decide cases. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judges adjudicating wrongful birth and wrongful life claims must act 
deliberately to ensure that the persistent current of stigmatizing stereotypes 
about people with disabilities does not infiltrate their judicial opinions.216  
In adopting a more contextual approach, courts must carefully consider the 
substantial hardships that families of children with disabilities endure while 
resisting inaccurate notions of harm, disability, and autonomy.217  Because 
judicial opinions influence societal views of the disability community and 
because the impact of negligent prenatal genetic testing is equally harmful, 
courts must always consider the variety of sensitive interests at stake.218  
Generally, the few scholars that have addressed these intricate concerns 
advocate “steps to help build social supports and attitudes that make it 
possible for a woman to go through a pregnancy even when the 
amniocentesis shows that the baby may carry a defect.”219  But until 
communities achieve this progress, courts that carefully account for the 
many social contexts in which genetic choices and reproductive disputes 
arise have an improved capacity to make sensitive and accurate 
decisions.220 
 
 
 213. PRIAULX, supra note 26, at 108.  This often occurs through the mitigation doctrine.  Id. 
 214. Id.  Professor Priaulx notes that courts emphasize that “claimants could have chosen 
otherwise.”  Id. 
 215. Id. at 109.  Professor Priaulx asserts that “neither abortion nor adoption constitute 
choices” in our current political, legal, and social climate.  Id. at 137. 
 216. See supra Part II.   
 217. See supra Part III.   
 218. See supra Part III.   
 219. Collins & Rodin, supra note 181, at 156. 
 220. See supra Part IV.   
